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Abstract
We develop a typed process calculus for security protocols in which types convey secrecy
properties. We focus on asymmetric communication primitives, especially on public-key en-
cryption. These present special di/culties, partly because they rely on related capabilities (e.g.,
“public” and “private” keys) with di3erent levels of secrecy and scopes.
c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A secret is something you tell to one person at a time, according to a popular
de6nition. Research on security has led to several other concepts of secrecy (e.g.
[2,17,34]). This paper studies secrecy in the context of security protocols with the
methods of process calculi and type systems. Here, a secret is a datum (such as a
cryptographic key) that never appears on a channel on which an adversary can listen,
even if the adversary actively tries to obtain the datum. We develop a process calculus
with a type system in which types convey secrecy properties and such that well-typed
programs keep their secrets.
Many security protocols use asymmetric communication primitives, namely com-
munication channels with only one 6xed end-point (the receiver) and particularly
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public-key encryption. These primitives present special di/culties, partly because they
rely on pairs of related capabilities (e.g., “public” and “private” keys) with di3erent
levels of secrecy and scopes. Therefore, we concentrate on these primitives, and their
treatment constitutes the main novelty of this work. An appendix gives correspond-
ing type rules for symmetric primitives, such as shared-key encryption; they are more
straightforward.
Basically, our type system is concerned with the question of when it is permissible
to tell a secret, and particularly to one person at a time. Telling it to one person at a
time means that any communication channel used to transmit the secret has a unique
receiver, or, if the secret is sent encrypted, that only one person has the corresponding
decryption key. Of course, the person in question should be allowed to know the
secret—it may still be a secret with respect to the adversary. Moreover, the person
should realize that this is a secret, and treat it accordingly. The type system helps
enforce these conditions.
The rest of this introduction describes the process calculus that serves as setting for
this work, the type system, and some of their properties. It also describes the di/culties
connected with public-key encryption and other asymmetric communication primitives.
Along the way, the introduction mentions relevant related work.
1.1. The process calculus
The process calculus is a relative of the pi calculus [27] and the spi calculus [4]. It
includes channels with 6xed receivers, as in the local pi calculus [25], the join calculus
[16], and many object-oriented languages (e.g. [7]). Such a channel can be used for
transmitting secrets if the adversary cannot listen on the channel. On the other hand,
the capability for sending on the channel may be published. The channel may therefore
convey not only secrets but also public data from the adversary. The receiver needs
static and dynamic checks for distinguishing these two cases; our type system accounts
for some of these mechanisms.
In addition, the process calculus includes cryptographic operations, speci6cally pub-
lic-key encryption. In a public-key encryption scheme, the capabilities of encryption
and decryption are separate (e.g. [24]), and can be handled di3erently. Hence public-
key encryption is often called asymmetric encryption. Typically, the capability for
decryption (the “private” key) remains with one principal, while the capability for
encryption (the “public” key) may be published. Therefore, both secrets and public
data from the adversary may be encrypted under the public key. Thus, pleasingly,
public-key encryption resembles communication on channels with 6xed receivers. Our
process calculus and type system treat them analogously.
The phrase “public key” has at least two distinct meanings in this context. It may
refer to one of the two keys in a public-key cryptosystem, used for encrypting data or
for verifying digital signatures (which we do not treat here). Although such a key may
be widely known, and it often is in examples, it can also be kept secret. Alternatively,
a “public key” may be a key which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try
to use “public key” only with the latter meaning, and prefer “encryption key” for the
former.
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1.2. The type system
The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [15] and on the newer
trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. [1,11,19–21,28,29,32,35]). For example,
Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition,
the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like
standard type systems. For example, KSecret[T1; T2] is the type of a secret encryption
key that is used to encrypt pairs with components of respective types T1 and T2.
Similarly, KPublic[T1; T2] is the type of a public encryption key. Analogous types apply
to channels.
Substantial di/culties arise because, in the study of security protocols, we cannot
assume that the adversary politely obeys our typing discipline [1,11,33]. Although
honest protocol participants may use public channels and public keys according to
declared types, the adversary may be an untyped process and disregard those types.
Nevertheless, the declared types remain useful when combined with the static and
dynamic checks mentioned above.
In this respect, asymmetric communication primitives (channels with 6xed receivers,
public-key encryption) are more delicate and interesting than their symmetric counter-
parts (shared channels as in the pi calculus, shared-key encryption). A shared channel
or shared key that the adversary knows should never be employed for transmitting se-
crets, only public data. Therefore, types like KPublic[Secret] are useless in this setting; a
public shared key may simply be given the type Public. On the other hand, a channel
with a 6xed receiver may be employed for transmitting secrets, even if the adversary
knows it (as long as the adversary is not the receiver). Similarly, an encryption key in a
public-key cryptosystem may be employed for encrypting secrets, even if the adversary
knows it (as long as the adversary does not know the corresponding decryption key).
Therefore, types like KPublic[Secret] give useful information. For instance, although the
adversary may encrypt public data under a key of type KPublic[Secret], this type can
tell others that encrypting secrets under the key is acceptable too, that these secrets
will not escape. The typing of asymmetric communication primitives in the context of
an untyped adversary is the main novelty of this work.
1.3. Secrecy results
We prove a subject-reduction property, namely, that typing is preserved by com-
putation. Relying on this property, we also prove a secrecy theorem that shows that
well-typed processes do not reveal their secrets. As an example, let us consider a well-
typed process P with just two free names, a of type Public and k of type KSecret[T1; T2].
As an adversary, we allow any process Q with the free name a (and possibly other
free names, except for k). The secrecy theorem implies that the parallel composition
of P with an adversary Q never outputs k on a.
This kind of secrecy guarantee is common and useful in the analysis of security
protocols. It is particularly adequate and e3ective for dealing with the secrecy of fresh
values that can be viewed as atomic, such as keys and nonces. In contrast, secrecy
guarantees based on the concept of noninterference are better at excluding Oows of
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partial information about compound values and implicit information Oows. (See [2,
Section 6] for some further discussion and references.) Most type systems for secrecy
concern noninterference; a recent exception is that of Cardelli et al. [11].
1.4. Application to protocols
Our type system can be applied to some small but subtle security protocols. For
example, in the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol [30] (a standard test case),
one might expect a certain nonce to be secret; however, the protocol fails to typecheck
under the assumption that this nonce is secret. This failure is not a shortcoming of
the type system: it manifests Lowe’s attack on the protocol [23]. On the other hand,
a corrected version of the protocol does typecheck under the assumption. Our secrecy
theorem yields the expected secrecy property in this case.
A variety of other techniques have been applied to this sort of protocol analysis
(and to the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol in particular). They include theo-
rem proving, model checking, and control-Oow analysis methods (e.g. [9,10,23,26,31]).
Type-based analyses, such as ours and those cited above, are in part appealing because
of their simplicity and because of their connections to classical information-Oow meth-
ods. They do not require exhaustive state-space exploration; they take advantage of the
structure of protocols. On the other hand, they are not always applicable: some rea-
sonable examples fail to typecheck for trivial reasons (much as in virtually all typed
programming languages and logics). Typing is a discipline, and it works best for pro-
cesses that use channels and keys in disciplined ways, but disciplined design can lead
to more robust protocols [1,5,6].
In comparison with other type-based methods for reasoning about protocols, the
main novelty of this work is the treatment of asymmetric communication, as men-
tioned above. Several of the works cited concern secrecy properties of protocols with
symmetric communication; some recent research [18] also addresses authenticity prop-
erties of those protocols, using a sophisticated type-and-e3ect system. Going beyond
the general comparison of type-based analyses with other methods, it is harder to re-
late this work to research that treats asymmetric communication through those other
methods. However, next we mention a recent result that sheds some light on this point.
In another, popular line of research, security protocols are represented and studied as
logic programs [8,12–14,36] (see also [22] for some of the roots of this approach).
This line of research includes the treatment of protocols with asymmetric communi-
cation. Despite the huge super6cial di3erences between the type-based and the logic-
programming approaches, a recent result shows that typing rules like those of this
work have the same power as an automatic protocol checker based on a logic-program
representation [3].
1.5. Outline
The next section de6nes the process calculus. Section 3 de6nes a concept of secrecy.
Section 4 presents the type system. Section 5 establishes the secrecy theorem and other
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M;N ::= terms
x; y; z variable
a; b; c; k; s name
{M1; : : : ; Mn}M encryption
P;Q ::= processes
RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 output
a(x1; : : : ; xn):P input
0 nil
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
(a)P restriction
case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q decryption
if M=N then P else Q conditional
Fig. 1. Syntax of the process calculus.
results. Section 6 develops two examples. Section 7 concludes. The appendix shows
how to deal with symmetric communication primitives and gives some details of proofs.
2. The process calculus (untyped)
This section introduces our process calculus, by giving its syntax and informal
semantics and then formalizing its operational semantics.
2.1. Syntax and informal semantics
The syntax of our calculus is summarized in Fig. 1. It assumes an in6nite set of
names and an in6nite set of variables; a, b, c, k, s, and similar identi6ers range over
names, and x, y, and z range over variables. For simplicity, we do not formally separate
the names for channels and those for keys. The syntax distinguishes a category of terms
(data) and processes (programs). The terms are variables, names, and terms of the
form {M1; : : : ; Mn}M , which represent encryptions. The processes include constructs
for communication, concurrency, and dynamic name creation, roughly those of the
pi calculus, a construct for decryption (case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q), and a
conditional (if M=N then P else Q). As usual, we may omit an “else” clause when
it consists of the nil process 0.
The calculus is polyadic, in the sense that messages are tuples of terms, and asyn-
chronous, in the sense that the output construct does not have a built-in acknowl-
edgment. It is also local, as explained below. Therefore, the calculus could be called
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the local, asynchronous, polyadic spi calculus—but we refrain from such a jargon
overload.
The calculus is based on asymmetric communication: channels with only one 6xed
end-point (the receiver) and public-key encryption. We adopt an elegant, economical
approach to asymmetric communication from the local pi calculus [25]. In the local
pi calculus, input is possible only on channels that are syntactically represented by
names (and not variables). Output is possible on channels represented by names or
variables. Thus, the input capability for a channel a remains within the scope of the
restriction (a)P where a is created, while the output capability can be transmitted out-
side. Further, we extend this approach to public-key encryption, as follows. Decryption
is possible only with keys that are syntactically represented by names (and not vari-
ables). Encryption is possible with keys represented by names or variables. Thus, we
model that the encryption capability may be public while the decryption capability
remains private, in the scope where it is generated. We do not explicitly model the
distribution of decryption keys across scopes; it is relatively unimportant in public-key
cryptosystems.
Thus, when a name a refers to a channel, it represents both end-points of the channel,
that is, the capabilities for output and input on the channel. A variable can confer only
the former capability, even if its value is a at run-time. Similarly, a name k will not
represent a single encryption or decryption key, but rather the pair of an encryption
key and a corresponding decryption key. A variable can confer only the capability of
encrypting, even if its value is k at run-time. (The original spi calculus has a di3erent
syntax for key pairs: two di3erent terms represent the two keys in a pair, and there is
a function that generates public keys from secrets. We believe that our results can be
adapted to that syntax, but here, prefer the leaner local syntax.)
Speci6cally, the constructs for asymmetric communication are output, input, encryp-
tion, and decryption:
• The process RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 outputs the tuple M1; : : : ; Mn on M . Here an arbitrary
term M is used to refer to a channel: M can be a variable, a name, or even an
encryption. This last case is however unimportant for the present purposes; when M
is an encryption, no process can receive the message RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉.
• The process a(x1; : : : ; xn). P inputs a message with n components on channel a, then
executes P with the variables x1; : : : ; xn bound to the contents of the message. Note
that a must be a name.
• The term {M1; : : : ; Mn}M represents an encryption of the tuple M1; : : : ; Mn under M .
Here an arbitrary term M is used to refer to an encryption key: M can be a variable,
a name, or even an encryption. This last case is however unimportant, again; when
M is an encryption, no process can decrypt {M1; : : : ; Mn}M .
• In the process case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q, the term M is decrypted with the
key k. If M is indeed a ciphertext encrypted under k, and the underlying plaintext
has n components, then the process P is executed with the variables x1; : : : ; xn bound
to those components. Otherwise, the process Q is executed. Note that k must be a
name.
The remaining constructs are standard. The nil process 0 does nothing. The process
P |Q is the parallel composition of P and Q. The replication !P represents any number
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P | 0≡P
P |Q≡Q |P
(P |Q) |R≡P | (Q |R)
!P≡P | !P
(a1)(a2)P≡ (a2)(a1)P if a1 = a2
(a)(P |Q)≡P | (a)Q if a =∈ fn(P)
P≡Q⇒P |R≡Q |R
P≡Q⇒ !P≡ !Q
P≡Q⇒ (a)P≡ (a)Q
P≡P
Q≡P⇒P≡Q
P≡Q; Q≡R⇒P≡R
Fig. 2. Structural congruence.
of copies of the process P in parallel. The restriction (a)P creates a new name a,
and then executes P. The conditional if M=N then P else Q executes P if M and
N evaluate to the same closed term; otherwise, it executes Q. This construct is not
always present in relatives of the pi calculus, but it is helpful in modeling security
protocols.
For example, the following expression is a process:
(k)( Ra〈k〉 | !b(x): case x of {y}k : Rc〈y〉):
This process relies on three public channels, a, b, and c. It generates a fresh key pair
k; outputs the corresponding encryption key on a; and receives messages on b, 6ltering
for one encrypted under k, of which it outputs the plaintext on c.
The name a is bound in (a)P. The variables x1; : : : ; xn are bound in P in the
processes a(x1; : : : ; xn):P and case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q. We write fn(P) and
fv(P) for the sets of names and variables free in P, respectively. A process is closed if
it has no free variables; it may have free names. We identify processes up to renaming
of bound names and variables. We write {M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn} for the substitution that
replaces x1; : : : ; xn with M1; : : : ; Mn, respectively.
2.2. Formal semantics
The rules of Fig. 3 axiomatize the reduction relation → for processes; they
are a formal de6nition for the operational semantics of our calculus. The auxiliary
rules of Fig. 2 axiomatize the structural congruence relation ≡ ; this relation is
useful for transforming processes so that the reduction rules can be applied. Both
≡ and → are de6ned only on closed processes. (In particular, we do not include
rules for structural congruence under an input, a decryption, or a conditional;
such rules are not necessary to apply reduction rules.) All rules are fairly
standard.
Using this operational semantics, we can give a precise de6nition of a simple concept
of output, which we use below in a de6nition of secrecy. Here, →∗ is the reOexive
and transitive closure of →.
394 M. Abadi, B. Blanchet / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 387– 415
Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 | a(x1; : : : ; xn):P
→P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn} (Red I/O)
case {M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q
→P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn} (Red Decrypt 1)
case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q→Q
if M is not of the form {M1; : : : ; Mn}k (Red Decrypt 2)
if M=M then P else Q→P (Red Cond 1)
if M=N then P else Q→Q
if M =N (Red Cond 2)
P→Q⇒P |R→Q |R (Red Par)
P→Q⇒ (a)P→ (a)Q (Red Res)
P′≡P; P→Q; Q≡Q′⇒P′→Q′ (Red ≡ )
Fig. 3. Reduction.
Denition 2.1. The process P outputs M immediately on c if and only if P≡ Rc〈M 〉 |R
for some process R. The process P outputs M on c if and only if P→∗ Q and Q
outputs M immediately on c for some process Q.
3. A denition of secrecy
This section de6nes a concept of secrecy for the calculus, relying on the operational
semantics of Section 2.2.
We think of an attacker as any process Q of the calculus, under some restrictions that
characterize the attacker’s initial capabilities. We formulate the restrictions by using a
set of names RW (“read-write”) and a set of closed terms W (“write”). Initially, the
attacker is able to output, input, encrypt, and decrypt using the names of RW . He
can output and encrypt using names in W . He has the terms in RW and W , and can
compute on them and include them in messages. In the course of computation, the
attacker may acquire some additional capabilities not represented in RW and W , by
creating fresh names and receiving terms in messages.
In order to express the limited use of the terms in W , we also introduce a set
of variables {x1; : : : ; xl} of the same cardinality l as W . When W= {M1; : : : ; Ml}, the
attacker is a process Q of the form Q′{M1=x1; : : : ; Ml=xl}. Since Q′ should be a well-
formed process before the application of the substitution {M1=x1; : : : ; Ml=xl}, it cannot
input or decrypt using the variables {x1; : : : ; xl}. Further, in order to express that the
attacker cannot initially use any other names or terms, we impose that fn(Q′)⊆RW
and fv(Q′)⊆{x1; : : : ; xl}.
Denition 3.1. Let RW be a 6nite set of names and let W= {M1; : : : ; Ml} be a 6-
nite set of closed terms. The process Q is a (RW ; W )-adversary if and only if it
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is of the form Q′{M1=x1; : : : ; Ml=xl} for some process Q′ such that fn(Q′)⊆RW and
fv(Q′)⊆{x1; : : : ; xl}.
We say that a process preserves the secrecy of a piece of data M if the process
never publishes M , or anything that would permit the computation of M , even in
interaction with an attacker. This concept of secrecy is common in the literature on
security protocols. A precise de6nition of it appears in [2], for the spi calculus; Cardelli
et al. use that de6nition in their work on secrecy and groups in the pi calculus [11].
Here we introduce and use a di3erent de6nition that captures the same concept. This
de6nition takes into account asymmetric communication; it is also more syntactic, and
a little easier to treat in our proofs.
Denition 3.2. Let RW be a 6nite set of names and let W be a 6nite set of closed
terms. The process P preserves the secrecy of M from (RW ; W ) if and only if P |Q
does not output M on c for any (RW ; W )-adversary Q and any c∈RW .
Clearly, if P preserves the secrecy of M from (RW ; W ), it cannot output M on
some c∈RW , that is, on one of the channels on which an (RW ; W )-adversary can
read. This guarantee corresponds to the informal requirement that P never publishes
M on its own. Moreover, P cannot publish data that would enable an adversary
to compute M , because the adversary could go on to output M on some
c∈RW .
For instance, (k) Ra〈{s}k ; k〉 preserves the secrecy of s from ({a}; ∅). This process
publishes an encryption of s and the corresponding encryption key on the channel a,
but keeps the decryption key, so s does not escape. Similarly, Ra〈{s}k ; k〉 preserves the
secrecy of s from ({a}; {k}). However, Ra〈{s}k ; k〉 does not preserve the secrecy of s
from ({a; k}; ∅): the adversary
a(x; y): case x of {z}k : Ra〈z〉
can receive {s}k on a, decrypt s, and resend it on a. As a more substantial, untyped
example we consider the following process P:
P , (k)( Ra〈{k1; k2}k〉 | !b(x): case x of {y1; y2}k : Rc〈y1〉):
This process relies on three public channels, a, b, and c. It generates a fresh key
pair k; outputs the encryption {k1; k2}k on a; and receives messages on b, 6ltering for
one encrypted under k, of which it outputs the 6rst component of the plaintext on c.
Although P does not output k1 in clear on its own, it does not preserve the secrecy of
k1 from ({a; c}; {b}): the adversary
a(x): Rb〈x〉
can receive {k1; k2}k on a and resend it on b, causing k1 to appear on c. On the other
hand, P does preserve the secrecy of k2 from ({a; c}; {b}). Other examples appear in
Section 6; they are larger and have types.
396 M. Abadi, B. Blanchet / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 387– 415
4. The type system
The types of our type system are de6ned by the grammar:
T ::= types
Public
Secret
CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]
CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]
KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]
KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]
We let L range over {Public;Secret}, and may for example write CL[T1; : : : ; Tn] and
KL[T1; : : : ; Tn]. The subtyping relation is the least reOexive relation such that CL[T1; : : : ;
Tn]6L and KL[T1; : : : ; Tn]6L, that is, such that:
CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]6 Public
CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]6 Secret
KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]6 Public
KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]6 Secret
(We do not have Secret6Public or vice versa.)
The types have the following informal meanings:
• Public is the type of public data, and is a supertype of all types CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]
and KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn].
• Similarly, Secret is the type of secret data, and is a supertype of all types CSecret[T1;
: : : ; Tn] and KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn].
• CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] is the type of a channel on which the adversary cannot send mes-
sages, and which conveys n-tuples with components of respective types T1; : : : ; Tn.
• Similarly, KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] is the type of an encryption key that the adversary does
not have, and which is used to encrypt n-tuples with components of respective types
T1; : : : ; Tn.
• CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn] is the type of a channel on which the adversary may send messages;
the channel may be intended to convey n-tuples with components of respective types
T1; : : : ; Tn, but the adversary may send any data it has (that is, any public data) on
the channel.
• Similarly, KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn] is the type of an encryption key that the adversary may
have; this key may be intended for encrypting n-tuples with components of respective
types T1; : : : ; Tn, but the adversary may encrypt any data it has (that is, any public
data) under this key.
Figs. 4 and 5 give the rules of the type system. In the rules, the metavariable u ranges
over names and variables. The rules concern four judgments:
• E   means that E is a well-formed environment. The environment E is well-formed
if and only if E is a list of pairs u :T where each u is a name or a variable and
distinct from all others in E.
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Well-formed environment:
∅ 
E   u =∈ dom(E)
E; u :T  
Terms:
E   (u : T )∈E
E  u :T (Atom)
E M : Public ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi : Public
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : Public (Encrypt Public)
E M : KL[T1; : : : ; Tn] ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi :Ti
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : Public (Encrypt K
L)
E M :T T6T ′
E M :T ′ (Subsumption)
Sets of types of terms:
E   (x :T )∈E
E  x : {T ′ |T ′6T} (Variables)
E   (a :T )∈E
E  a : {T} (Names)
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : Public
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : {Public} (Encryptions)
Fig. 4. Type rules: environments and terms.
• E M :T means that M is a term of type T in the environment E. Basically, names
and variables have the types declared in E, and any supertypes, while encryptions
all have the type Public.
• E  M : S means that S is the set of possible “true” types of M in the
environment E.
• E P says that the process P is well-typed in the environment E.
The type rules for output say that any public data can be sent on a public channel
(Output Public), and tuples with the expected types T1; : : : ; Tn can be sent on a channel
of type CL[T1; : : : ; Tn] (Output CL). Therefore, by subtyping, any public data can be
sent on a channel of type CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tn]. This use of the channel may not seem
to conform to its declared type. However, it is unavoidable, since we expect that an
attacker can use the channel; moreover, it does not cause harm from the point of view
of secrecy. Similarly, the type rule (Output Public) also permits processes that use
an encryption as a channel, such as {M}k〈N 〉. A standard type system might attempt
to exclude such processes. Ours does not, essentially because an attacker might run
{M}k〈N 〉, but this does not cause harm from the point of view of secrecy. On the
other hand, the attacker cannot have channels of type CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]. Therefore, we
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E M : Public ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi : Public
E  RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉
(Output Public)
E M : CL[T1; : : : ; Tn] ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi :Ti
E  RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉
(Output CL)
(a : Public)∈E E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP
E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P (Input Public)
(a : CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tm])∈E E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP
E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xm :Tm P if m= n
E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P (Input C
Public)
(a : CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn])∈E E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P
E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P (Input C
Secret)
E  
E  0 (Nil)
E P E Q
E P |Q (Parallel)
E P
E  !P (Replication)
E; a :T P
E  (a)P (Restriction)
E M : Public (k : Public)∈E
E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP E Q
E  case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q (Decrypt Public)
E M : Public (k : KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tm])∈E
E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP E Q
E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xm :Tm P if m= n
E  case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q (Decrypt K
Public)
E M : Public (k : KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn])∈E
E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P E Q
E  case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q (Decrypt K
Secret)
E  M : S1 E  N : S2 if S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ then E P E Q
E  if M=N then P else Q (Cond)
Fig. 5. Type rules: processes.
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can guarantee that such channels are represented by names at run-time and that only
tuples with types T1; : : : ; Tn can be sent on such channels.
As for input, we distinguish three cases, considering the type of the channel a on
which an input happens:
• If a is of type Public, then the corresponding output must have been typed using
(Output Public), so the input values are public. Rule (Input Public) treats this case.
This rule may seem superOuously liberal, but it is helpful in our proofs. It enables us
to type an arbitrary adversary, which can input public values on the public channels
on which it listens (see Section 5).
• When a is of type CPublic[T1; : : : ; Tm], two cases arise. In the 6rst case, the
corresponding output has been typed using (Output Public) and subtyping.
Then the input values are of type Public. In the second case, the corresponding
output has been typed using (Output CL). In this case, the input values have the
expected types T1; : : : ; Tm, and we need only consider the situation where the number
of inputs (m) equals the number of input variables in the process (n) since com-
munication will not happen otherwise. Rule (Input CPublic) takes into account both
cases, by checking that the process P executed after the input is well-typed in both.
• When a is of type CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn], it cannot be known by the attacker, and the
corresponding output must have been typed using (Output CL). The input values are
therefore of the expected types T1; : : : ; Tn.
The type rules for encryption are similar to those for output. Any public data can be
encrypted under a public encryption key (Encrypt Public), and data of types T1; : : : ; Tn
can be encrypted under a key of type KL[T1; : : : ; Tn] (Encrypt KL). Ciphertexts are
always of type Public; this typing simpli6es the rules and is reasonable for most
protocols (particularly for most public-key protocols).
The type rules for decryption resemble those for input, in the same way as those
for encryption resemble those for output.
The type rules for nil, parallel composition, replication, and restriction are standard.
It is worth noting that we use a Curry-style typing for restriction, so we do not mention
a type of a explicitly in the construct (a). In contrast, in a Church-style typing, we
would write (a :T ) for some T instead of (a), and we would have the rule:
E; a : T  P
E  (a : T )P
in which the process (a :T )P in the conclusion “forces” the choice of T in the hypoth-
esis. The Curry-style typing gives rise to an interesting form of polymorphism: the type
of a can change according to the environment. For instance, in c(x):(a) Rx〈a〉, with c of
type CPublic[CSecret[Secret]], a can be of type Secret when x is of type CSecret[Secret],
and of type Public when x is of type Public, so that the output Rx〈a〉 is well-typed in
both cases.
Rule (Cond) exploits the idea that if two terms M and N cannot have the same
type, then they are certainly di3erent. In this case, the process if M=N then P else Q
may be well-typed without P being well-typed. To determine whether M and N may
have the same type, we determine the set of possible types of M and N . If M is a
variable x, and (x :T )∈E, then x may of course have type T . Because of subtyping,
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x may also be substituted at run-time by a name whose type is a subtype of T . Hence
the possible types of x are {T ′ |T ′6T}. When M is a name a, its only possible type
is the type assigned to it in the environment. When M is a ciphertext, its only possible
type is Public, by de6nition of the judgment E M :T .
The following example illustrates the use of rule (Cond), informally. Suppose that a
participant A in a security protocol invents a fresh quantity a of type Secret (as a nonce
challenge), sends it on a channel of type CSecret[Secret], so a should remain secret.
Some time later, A gets a ciphertext encrypted under a key k of type KPublic[Secret; T ];
decryption yields a pair x1; x2. The type system covers two possibilities: (1) x1 has
type Secret and x2 has type T , (2) both are public (for example, because the attacker
constructed the ciphertext). That is, the type rule for decryption (Decrypt KPublic) has
hypotheses that correspond to each of these possibilities. Suppose further that A checks,
dynamically, that x1 = a (and halts if x1 = a). This check guarantees that x1 has type
Secret, and hence is not public. At the same time, it guarantees that x2 has type T .
After the check, A can assume that x2 has type T , and act accordingly. Dynamic checks
of this sort are common and important in security protocols, for example in those of
Section 6.
This type system reOects a binary view of secrecy, according to which the world
is divided into system and attacker, and a secret is something that the attacker does
not have. When we wish to express that a piece of data is a secret for a given set
of principals, we de6ne the system to include only the processes that represent those
principals.
In this respect and in others, our type system is most similar to that of Abadi [1]
for the spi calculus and that of Cardelli et al. [11, Section 4] for the pi calculus.
Both treat only symmetric communication primitives. The latter, however, is mostly
introduced as an auxiliary type system for a proof. The proof concerns another type
system, which elegantly exploits a powerful construct for group creation. Group creation
directly supports a rich view of secrecy that does not simply divide the world into
two parts. We believe that the type system with group creation can be extended with
symmetric cryptographic primitives, of the kind modeled in the appendix, and further
extended to deal with asymmetric communication. Unfortunately (as far as we can tell)
this last extension does not retain the elegance of the original.
5. The secrecy theorem and other results
This section studies the type system of Section 4. First it establishes a subject-
reduction theorem and a typability lemma. Then it derives the secrecy theorem sketched
in the introduction. Finally, it touches on the question of the existence of “best” typings.
5.1. Subject reduction and typability
The subject-reduction theorem says that typing is preserved by computation. We
give details of its proof in the appendix; it is mostly a fairly routine induction on
computations with a case analysis on typing proofs.
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Theorem 5.1 (Subject congruence and subject reduction). If E P and if P≡Q or
P→Q then E Q.
The following typability lemma says that every process is well-typed, at least in a
fairly trivial way that makes its free names public. This lemma is important because
it means that any process that represents an adversary is well-typed. It is a formal
counterpart to the informal idea that the type system cannot constrain the adversary.
Lemma 5.1 (Typability). Let P be an untyped process. If fn(P)⊆{a1; : : : ; an}, fv(P)⊆
{x1; : : : ; xm}, and Ti6Public for all i∈{1; : : : ; m}, then
a1 : Public; : : : ; an : Public; x1 : T1; : : : ; xm : Tm  P
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of P. In the case of restriction, the
type of the new name is Public. Input is typed by (Input Public), output by (Output
Public), decryption by (Decrypt Public), and encryption by (Encrypt Public).
5.2. Secrecy
The secrecy theorem says that if a closed process P is well-typed in an environment
E, and a name s has type Secret in E, then P preserves the secrecy of s from (RW ; W ),
where RW is the set of names declared Public in E, and W is the set of names
declared CPublic[: : :] or KPublic[: : :]. The name s may be declared Secret in E, but it
may also be declared CSecret[: : :] or KSecret[: : :]. In other words, P preserves the secrecy
of Secret names against adversaries that can output, input, encrypt, and decrypt on
names declared Public and that can output and encrypt on names declared CPublic[: : :]
and KPublic[: : :].
Theorem 5.2 (Secrecy). Let P be a closed process. Suppose that E P and E  s :
Secret. Let
RW = {a | (a : Public) ∈ E}
W = {a′ | (a′ : CPublic[: : :]) ∈ E or (a′ : KPublic[: : :]) ∈ E}
Then P preserves the secrecy of s from (RW ; W ).
Proof. The secrecy theorem is a fairly easy consequence of the subject-reduction the-
orem and the typability lemma. (In truth, the type system and the de6nition of secrecy
were re6ned with this proof of the secrecy theorem in mind.)
Suppose that RW = {a1; : : : ; an} and W= {a′1; : : : ; a′l}, and that T ′i is the type of a′i
in E, so (a′i :T
′
i )∈E for all i∈{1; : : : ; l}.
In order to derive a contradiction, we assume that P does not preserve the se-
crecy of s from (RW ; W ). Then there exists a process Q=Q′{a′1=x1; : : : ; a′l=xl} with
fn(Q′)⊆RW and fv(Q′)⊆{x1; : : : ; xl}, such that P |Q→∗R and R≡ Rc〈s〉 |R′, where
c∈RW . By Lemma 5.1, a1 : Public; : : : ; an : Public; x1 :T ′1 ; : : : ; xl :T ′l Q′. By a standard
substitution lemma (Lemma 2, given in the appendix), E Q′{a′1=x1; : : : ; a′l=xl}, that is,
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E Q. Therefore, E P |Q. By Theorem 5.1, E R and E  Rc〈s〉 |R′. Since c∈RW ,
we have (c : Public)∈E, so E  Rc〈s〉 could have been derived only by (Output Public).
Such a derivation would require that E  s : Public. However, this is impossible, since
we have E  s : Secret and the two typings are incompatible. We have a contradiction,
so P preserves the secrecy of s from (RW ; W ).
We restate a special case of the theorem, as it may be particularly clear.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose that a : Public; s :T P with T6Secret. Then P preserves the
secrecy of s from ({a}; ∅). That is, for all closed processes Q such that fn(Q)⊆{a},
P |Q does not output s on a.
For instance, we can obtain a : Public; s : Secret  (k) Ra〈{s}k ; k〉 by letting k :
KPublic[Secret]. So this corollary implies that (k) Ra〈{s}k ; k〉 preserves the secrecy of
s from ({a}; ∅), as claimed in Section 3. In other words, if Q is a closed process
and fn(Q)⊆{a}, then ((k) Ra〈{s}k ; k〉) |Q does not output s on a. Thus, assuming that
Q does not have s in advance, Q cannot guess s or compute it from the message
on a.
As this example illustrates, the theorem and the corollary depend crucially on the
locality of the calculus. In this example, an adversary Q that could use k to de-
crypt s would be able to compromise the secrecy of s and contradict the corollary.
However, such an adversary would violate the locality condition. For instance, we
could try to de6ne Q by the expression a(x; y):case x of {z}y : Ra〈z〉. This expres-
sion is not a syntactically legal process because it uses the variable y as a de-
cryption key.
Modifying the example, we may also consider the process (k) Ra〈{s}k ; {s; s}k〉. This
process uses k to encrypt two messages of di3erent formats. We may therefore argue
that the process violates the helpful principle that each key should be used for only one
purpose. The process typechecks only with k of type Public. Therefore, typing cannot
yield that the process preserves the secrecy of s from ({a}; ∅). Thus, this example
illustrates the incompleteness of typing.
Further examples appear in Section 6.
5.3. “Most secret” typings
The secrecy theorem provides a method for proving that a process P preserves the
secrecy of a name. Suppose that in fact P preserves the secrecy of two di3erent names
s and s′, and that this can be proved using the secrecy theorem, treating each of the
names separately. The two applications of the secrecy theorem may in general rely on
two di3erent ways of showing that P is well-typed, with two di3erent typing envi-
ronments E and E′. We must have that E  s : Secret and E′  s′ : Secret. However, we
may also have E  s′ : Public and E′  s : Public. Ideally, in order to save work, we may
like to have a single environment E such that E P, E  s : Secret, and E  s′ : Secret.
Roughly, E should make secret as much as possible, thus providing a “most secret”
typing for P.
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Unfortunately, “most secret” typings do not always exist, as the following small
example indicates. For the process P,
P , Rc〈s; a〉 | Rc〈a; s′〉
we can establish both:
a : Public; c : CPublic[Secret;Public]; s : Secret; s′ : Public  P
a : Public; c : CPublic[Public;Secret]; s : Public; s′ : Secret  P
but we cannot establish:
a : Public; c : T0; s : Secret; s′ : Secret  P
for any T0, or even
a : Public; c : T0; s : T; s′ : T ′  P
for any T0, T , and T ′ such that T; T ′6Secret. Here we set a : Public in order to model
that the attacker may have a; the constraint a : Public can also be imposed, arti6cially,
by putting a(x):case x of {y}a : 0 in parallel with P. This example uses only a modest
fragment of the process calculus; other examples should arise from the type rule for
conditionals.
6. Typed examples
This section develops two examples, based on security protocols. The 6rst protocol
does not rely on cryptography; the second one, the Needham–Schroeder public-key
protocol, does. Although both are fairly small, informal reasoning about them is error-
prone and di/cult. The type system provides a simple yet rigorous approach for proving
secrecy properties of the protocols.
In the examples, we use notations common in informal protocol descriptions. We
present a protocol by listing the messages exchanged by its participants. A step where
A sends a message M to B on a channel c is written:
Message n. A→B :M on c
or simply
Message n. A→B :M
if the channel is public and unimportant. However, this notation should be interpreted
with care. Although B is the intended receiver of the message M , anyone else who
can listen on channel c may get M instead of B, and B may not get M at all, or may
get a di3erent message. The integer n indicates that this step is intended as the nth in
a protocol execution, though again this information should be viewed as a wish or a
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hint rather than as a guarantee. If assurance is needed about any of these matters it
must be provided as part of the function of the protocol (see [2,5]).
6.1. An example without cryptography
Although this example does not include cryptography, it resembles some examples
that do. It concerns the following protocol in which a principal A sends a secret s to
a principal B:
Message 1. A→B : k; a on b
Message 2. B→A : k; b′ on a
Message 3. A→B : s on b′
Here, a and b are channels with A and B as only receivers, respectively; k is a secret
nonce, created by A; and b′ is a new channel, created by B, with B as only receiver and
A as only sender. Instead of sending s directly on b, A creates the nonce k and sends
it along with the return channel a on b; B’s reply contains k, as proof of origin; the
reply also includes the fresh channel b′ on which A sends s. This channel is analogous
to a session key in a cryptographic protocol.
In our calculus, we may represent the principals of this protocol by the processes:
A, (k)( Rb〈k; a〉 | a(x; y): if x = k then Ry〈s〉)
and
B, b(x; y):(b′)( Ry〈x; b′〉 | b′(z):0)
We can then use our type system to prove that s remains secret, as expected. For this
proof, we let:
E, a : CPublic[Secret;CSecret[Secret]];
b : CPublic[Secret;CPublic[Secret;CSecret[Secret]]];
s : Secret
and obtain E; c : PublicA |B for any c, as follows. In the typing of A, we choose
k : Secret. The output Rb〈k; a〉 is then typed by (Output CL). The input a(x; y) is typed
by (Input CPublic), and two cases arise:
1. x : Public; y : Public: This case is vacuous by rule (Cond): in the test x= k, the two
terms cannot have the same type.
2. x : Secret; y : CSecret[Secret]: In this case, the output Ry〈s〉 is typed by (Output CL).
The input b(x; y) is also typed by (Input CPublic), and again two cases arise:
1. x : Public; y : Public: In this case, we let b′ : Public.
2. x : Secret; y : CPublic[Secret;CSecret[Secret]]: In this case, instead, we let b′ :
CSecret[Secret].
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In both cases, the rest of process B is easy to typecheck. Having derived E; c :
PublicA |B, we apply Theorem 5.2, and conclude that A |B preserves the secrecy
of s from ({c}; {a; b}).
We can also treat a more general system in which A and B communicate with other
principals: A may initiate sessions with others than B, and B is willing to respond to
several principals at once. Still, s should remain within A |B, and not escape to third
parties.
The following process represents the system:
P , (A |A′) | !B
Here A′ is an arbitrary process, notionally grouped with A, which may receive mes-
sages on a, under the assumption that E; E′ A′ for some E′. In particular, this as-
sumption implies that A′ respects the secrecy of s and uses a in conformance with
a : CPublic[Secret;CSecret[Secret]]. For example, A′ may be
A′ , (k)( Rc〈k; a〉 | a(x; y): if x = k then Ry〈s′〉)
that is, a variant of A that initiates a session with a third party on the channel c
and sends s′. It follows that E; E′ P, so Theorem 5.2 still applies. Remarkably, the
replication of B causes no complication whatsoever. In contrast, replication tends to be
problematic for proof methods based on state-space exploration.
6.2. The Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol
The core of the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol [30] is as follows:
Message 1. A→B : {sA; A}kB
Message 2. B→A : {sA; sB}kA
Message 3. A→B : {sB}kB
In this description we assume that A knows B’s public encryption key kB in ad-
vance, and symmetrically that B knows A’s public encryption key kA in advance.
(Below, we even name A and B by their keys.) All messages are encrypted un-
der these keys and travel on public channels. In the 6rst message, A sends a fresh
nonce sA as well as the name A. In the second, B replies with sA and a fresh nonce
sB. Upon receipt of this message, A checks sA and resends sB to B in the 6nal
message.
The goals of this protocol are not entirely explicit in its original description. How-
ever, one might interpret that the protocol is intended to establish sA and sB as shared
secrets for A and B. Subsequently, A and B might combine these nonces in the com-
putation of a session key.
However, as Lowe pointed out, the protocol does not guarantee the secrecy of the
nonce sB [23]. An attacker C can run the protocol with A, and impersonate A in a
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concurrent run with B, obtaining sB from A:
Message 1. A→C : {sA; A}kC
Message 1’. C(A)→B : {sA; A}kB
Message 2’. B→C(A) : {sA; sB}kA
Message 2. C→A : {sA; sB}kA
Message 3. A→C : {sB}kC
Message 3’. C(A)→B : {sB}kB
Here we prime the numbers of the messages of the protocol run in which C imper-
sonates A, and write C(A) for C in those messages.
Lowe’s variant of the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol defends against this
scenario with an extra 6eld that identi6es B in message 2:
Message 1. A→B : {sA; A}kB
Message 2. B→A : {sA; sB; B}kA
Message 3. A→B : {sB}kB
Upon receipt of message 2, A should check this 6eld, and send message 3 only if this
6eld identi6es the expected origin of the message. Thus, an attacker C cannot obtain
{sB}kC from A, because C cannot produce {sA; sB; C}kA to send to A.
Our type system provides a new perspective on the Needham–Schroeder public-key
protocol and on Lowe’s variant. After expressing a fragment of the original protocol in
our process calculus, we show that it does not typecheck under the assumption that sB
secret. The failure of typechecking corresponds to Lowe’s scenario. Then we consider
a stronger variant, for which we can establish the secrecy of sA and sB by typing.
6.2.1. Typing the original protocol (or not)
We represent the original protocol with the processes:
P, A |B
A, AB |AC1 | : : : |ACn
AX , (sA)A′X
A′X , cX 〈{sA; kA}kX 〉
| cA(x): case x of {y1; y2}kA : if y1 = sA then cX 〈{y2}kX 〉
B, (sB)B′
B′, cB(x): case x of {y1; y2}kB :
if y2 = kA then (cA〈{y1; sB}kA〉 | cB(z1): case z1 of {z2}kB : 0)
The process P represents a complete system that consists of n+ 1 instances of A and
one instance of B. One of the instances of A, called AB, starts a session with B; the
others, with other principals C1; : : : ; Cn. In AX , we represent the identity of A by the
key kA. For simplicity, we write B so that it communicates only with A, as this su/ces
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in Lowe’s scenario and for our present purposes. We use channel cX for messages to
principal X , but leave open the scope of cX so that the adversary may also receive
those messages.
Attempting to type these processes, we set cA; cB; cC1 ; : : : ; cCn : Public. These types
correspond to the assumption that the adversary can receive the messages sent on
cA; cB; cC1 ; : : : ; cCn . We set kC1 ; : : : ; kCn : Public. These types mean that the adversary can
decrypt using the keys kC1 ; : : : ; kCn , and corresponds to the view of the third parties
C1; : : : ; Cn as part of the adversary. The keys kA and kB should be of types of the form
KPublic[: : :], since they may be used for encryption by anyone. Finally, we may hope
to have sA : Secret in A and sB : Secret in B, since we may expect these nonces to be
secret—and may hope to apply Theorem 5.2. However, this typing attempt fails.
More precisely, we let:
E, cA : Public; cB : Public; cC1 : Public; : : : ; cCn : Public;
kC1 : Public; : : : ; kCn : Public;
kA : KPublic[: : :]; kB : KPublic[: : :];
sB : Secret
Then:
E 0 A |B′
This failure appears when we try to type AC1 and B
′. For B′, we need kA : KPublic[Public;
Secret]. Therefore, we may have y2 : Secret in AC1 , but then the message RcC1〈{y2}kC1 〉 is
not well-typed, since kC1 : Public. The test y1 = sA in AC1 cannot eliminate this conOict,
because y1 : Public (by the type of kA) and also sA : Public (because AC1 sends sA under
kC1 ). In summary, as Lowe’s scenario demonstrates, y2 should (sometimes) be treated
as a secret in AC1 , yet y2 is given to C1, which is part of the adversary.
6.2.2. Typing a stronger variant
A stronger variant of the Needham–Schroeder protocol does not su3er from this
typing failure. In our calculus, this variant is
P, A |B
A, AB |AC1 | : : : |ACn
AX , (sA)A′X
A′X , cX 〈{sA; kA}kX 〉
|cA(x): case x of {y1; y2; y3}kA :
if y3 = kX then if y1 = sA then cX 〈{y2}y3〉
B, (sB)B′
B′, |cB(x): case x of {y1; y2}kB :
if y2 = kA then (cA〈{y1; sB; kB}kA〉
|cB(z1): case z1 of {z2}kB : 0)
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Much as Lowe suggested, B’s second message contains kB, identifying the origin of
the message. We can type this variant establishing that it preserves the secrecy of the
nonces sA and sB.
We consider sB 6rst. We let
E, cA : Public; cB : Public; cC1 : Public; : : : ; cCn : Public;
kC1 : Public; : : : ; kCn : Public;
kA : KPublic[Public;Secret;KPublic[Secret]];
kB : KPublic[Secret];
sB : Secret
and obtain
E  A |B′
from E; sA : PublicA′X and E B′, which in turn we prove as follows:
• For E; sA : PublicA′X , we 6rst obtain E; sA : Public RcX 〈{sA; kA}kX 〉 by (Encrypt
Public). In addition, we apply (Decrypt KPublic) to the decryption of {y1; y2; y3}kA ,
and two cases arise:
1. y1 : Public; y2 : Public; y3 : Public: The encryption {y2}y3 is typed by (Encrypt
Public).
2. y1 : Public; y2 : Secret; y3 : KPublic[Secret]: In AB, the encryption {y2}y3 is typed
by (Encrypt KL). In AC1 ; : : : ; ACn , the test y3 = kX eliminates this case, since
there kX ’s type is Public.
• In B′, we type the 6rst decryption by (Decrypt KPublic), with y1 : Public and y2 :
Public. We type the encryption {y1; sB; kB}kA using (Encrypt KL), and the decryption
of {z2}kB using (Decrypt KPublic).
Having derived E A |B′, we apply Theorem 5.2, and conclude that A |B′ preserves
the secrecy of sB from
({cA; cB; cC1 ; : : : ; cCn ; kC1 ; : : : ; kCn}; {kA; kB}):
In order to establish the secrecy of sA, now, we let
E, cA : Public; cB : Public; cC1 : Public; : : : ; cCn : Public;
kC1 : Public; : : : ; kCn : Public;
kA : KPublic[Secret;Public;KPublic[Secret;Public]];
kB : KPublic[Secret;Public];
sA : Secret
and obtain
E  A′B |B |AC1 | : : : |ACn :
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This typing is similar to that for sB; it uses sA : Public in AC1 ; : : : ; ACn and sB : Public.
We apply Theorem 5.2, and conclude that A′B |B |AC1 | : : : |ACn preserves the secrecy
of sA from
({cA; cB; cC1 ; : : : ; cCn ; kC1 ; : : : ; kCn}; {kA; kB}):
While we 6nd this example satisfying, it also suggests some possible improve-
ments to the type system. First, the proofs of secrecy for sA and sB are clearly
separate, and they even rely on di3erent types for kA and kB. This separation may
be unfortunate but inevitable within the type system; Section 5.3 shows a simpler
example of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the type system allows the use of the
key kB for two messages of di3erent sizes because all the components of one of
the messages are public, but it is not hard to imagine protocols where more gen-
eral rules for polymorphic and dynamic typing would be needed in similar
situations.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a type system that can serve in establishing secrecy properties
of processes. The type system is super6cially straightforward: it consists of fairly ele-
mentary rules in a standard format. The proof of its soundness (the subject-reduction
theorem) is also fairly standard; the subject-reduction theorem then yields the main
secrecy theorem. This simplicity is not entirely accidental: we explored more com-
plex type systems (with dependent types) and notions of secrecy before arriving at the
current ones.
On the other hand, the type system is powerful enough to apply to some delicate
security protocols, yielding concise proofs for subtle results. It is also fairly tricky,
when examined more closely. For instance, as indicated above, the type rules allow
certain forms of polymorphism.
In a recent continuation of this work [3], we develop a generic type system for
a process calculus that extends the pi calculus with constructor operations and corre-
sponding destructor operations. These operations may be, for instance, tupling and pro-
jection, symmetric encryption and decryption, asymmetric encryption and decryption,
digital signatures and signature checking, and one-way hashing (with no corresponding
destructor). Like the type system of this paper, on which it builds, the generic type
system conveys secrecy information.
A challenging subject for further work is to develop type systems with richer forms
of polymorphism, with stronger theories, perhaps even with algorithms for inferring
secrecy types. In another direction, it would be useful to integrate proofs by typing
with other proof methods.
Appendix A. Symmetric communication
Type systems analogous to that of Section 4 can be developed for processes that
rely on symmetric communication primitives. We sketch such a type system for an
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M;N ::= terms
x; y; z variable
a; b; c; k; s name
{M1; : : : ; Mn}M encryption
P;Q ::= processes
RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 output
M (x1; : : : ; xn):P input
0 nil
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
(a)P restriction
case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}N :P else Q decryption
if M=N then P else Q conditional
Fig. 6. Syntax of the process calculus with symmetric communication primitives.
extension of the pi calculus with shared-key cryptography, a basic spi calculus. The
syntax of the process calculus is given in Fig. 6.
As indicated in the introduction, we do not need types such as CPublic[Secret] and
KPublic[Secret] in this type system. We simply assign the type Public to all the data that
the adversary may have. We can also do without subtyping, so the judgment E  M : S
is no longer needed. The following grammar for types su/ces:
T ::= types
Public
CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]
KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]
Some type rules remain unchanged; others can be removed or simpli6ed. The rules
(Output CL) and (Encrypt KL) are restricted to the case L=Secret, since the types
KPublic[: : :] and CPublic[: : :] no longer exist. The rules (Input CPublic) and (Decrypt KPublic)
are removed for the same reason. The other rules for input and decryption have to
be adapted since any term can be used to represent an input channel or a decryp-
tion key, not just names. The rule for conditionals, (Cond), is simpler because of the
absence of subtyping. Fig. 7 summarizes the resulting type system. It is an exten-
sion of the type system of Cardelli et al. [11, Section 4] to shared-key cryptography,
with the notations Public instead of Un (untrusted) and CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] instead of
Ch[T1; : : : ; Tn].
As a simple example, let us consider the trivial process:
(k) Ra〈{s}k〉:
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The judgment E   is de6ned as in Section 4.
Terms:
E   (u : T )∈E
E  u :T (Atom)
E M : Public ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi : Public
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : Public (Encrypt Public)
E M : KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi :Ti
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}M : Public (Encrypt K
Secret)
Processes:
E M : Public ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi : Public
E  RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉
(Output Public)
E M : CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] ∀i∈{1; : : : ; n}; E Mi :Ti
E  RM 〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉
(Output CSecret)
E M : Public E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP
E M (x1; : : : ; xn):P (Input Public)
E M : CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn] E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P
E M (x1; : : : ; xn):P (Input C
Secret)
E M : Public E N : Public
E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP E Q
E  case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}N :P else Q (Decrypt Public)
E M : Public E N : KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn]
E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P E Q
E  case M of {x1; : : : ; xn}N :P else Q (Decrypt K
Secret)
E M :T1 E N :T2 if T1 =T2 then E P E Q
E  if M=N then P else Q (Cond)
Rules (Nil), (Parallel), (Replication), and (Restriction) are as in Section 4.
Fig. 7. Type rules in the symmetric case.
This process emits a name s on a public channel a under a fresh symmetric key
k. It can be checked with this type system, in particular with the type Public for
the free name a, the type KSecret[] for the free name s, and the type KSecret[KSecret[]]
for the bound name k. We obtain that this process preserves the secrecy of s
from {a}.
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Appendix B. Proof of subject reduction
This section gives additional details on the proof of subject reduction.
Lemma B.1 (Substitution): If E; E′ M :T and E; x :T; E′ M ′ :T ′ then E; E′ 
M ′{M=x}:T ′. If E; E′ M :T and E; x :T; E′ P then E; E′ P{M=x}.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivations of E; x :T; E′ M ′ :T ′ and of
E; x :T; E P. The treatment of most rules is straightforward. In the case of (Cond),
we use that if E; E′ M :T and E; x :T; E′  M ′ : S then E; E′  M ′{M=x} : S ′ with
S ′⊆ S. This property is obvious when M ′ = x. When M ′= x, we have S = {T ′ |T ′6T},
and we proceed by a case analysis on the form of M .
• When M is an encryption, T =Public and S ′= {Public}⊆ S.
• When M is a variable y, let T ′ be such that (y :T ′)∈E; E′. We have S ′= {T ′′ |T ′′
6T ′} and T ′6T (since (y :T ′)∈E; E′ and E; E′ M :T ). Therefore, S ′⊆ S.
• When M is a name a, let T ′ be such that (a :T ′)∈E; E′. We have S ′= {T ′} with
T ′6T . Therefore, S ′⊆ S.
Lemma B.2 (Subject congruence): If E P and P≡Q then E Q.
Proof. This proof is similar to the corresponding proof for the type system of Cardelli
et al. [11]; it is an easy induction on the derivation of P≡Q.
Lemma B.3 (Subject reduction): If E P and P→Q then E Q.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of P→Q. We detail the cases of
three reduction rules; the remaining cases are easy.
• In the case of (Red I/O), we have
Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 | a(x1; : : : ; xn):P → P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn}:
We assume E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 | a(x1; : : : ; xn):P. This must have been derived using the
rule (Parallel). Therefore, we have E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 and E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P. We dis-
tinguish three cases, corresponding to three possible derivations of
E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P.
1. If E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P has been derived using (Input CSecret), then (a :
CSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn])∈E and E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P. Therefore, E 0 a : Public, and
E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 has been derived using (Output CL). The hypotheses of this
rule include E Mi :Ti for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
2. If E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P has been derived using (Input CPublic), then (a : CPublic[T1;
: : : ; Tm])∈E, E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP, and, if m= n, E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn
:Tn P. If E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 has been derived using (Output Public), we have
E Mi : Public for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}. If E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉 has been derived using
(Output CL), we have m= n and E Mi :Ti for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
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3. If E  a(x1; : : : ; xn):P has been derived using (Input Public), then (a:Public)∈E and
E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP. Therefore, E 0 a : CL[: : :], →E  Ra〈M1; : : : ; Mn〉
has been derived using (Output Public). The hypotheses of this rule
include E Mi : Public for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
In all cases, we obtain E P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn} by Lemma 2.
• In the case of (Red Cond 1), we have if M=M then P else Q→P. We assume
E  if M=M then P else Q. This must have been derived using (Cond) from
E  M : S1, E  M : S2, E Q, and, if S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, E P. Since E  M : S1 and
E  M : S2 imply that S1= S2 = ∅, we obtain E P.
• In the case of (Red Decrypt 1), we have
case{M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k : P else Q
→ P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn}
We assume E  case {M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q. We distinguish three
cases, corresponding to three possible derivations of this judgment.
1. If E  case {M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q has been derived using
(Decrypt KSecret), then (k : KSecret[T1; : : : ; Tn])∈E and E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P.
Therefore, E 0 k : Public, and E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}k : Public has been derived using
(Encrypt KL). The hypotheses of this rule include E Mi :Ti for
all i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
2. If E  case {M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q has been derived using
(Decrypt KPublic), then (k : KPublic[T1; : : : ; Tm])∈E; E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP,
and, if m= n, E; x1 :T1; : : : ; xn :Tn P. If E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}k : Public has been de-
rived using (Encrypt Public), we have E Mi : Public for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}. If
E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}k : Public has been derived using (Encrypt KL), we have m= n
and E Mi :Ti for all i∈{1; : : : ; n}.
3. If E  case {M1; : : : ; Mn}k of {x1; : : : ; xn}k :P else Q has been derived using
(Decrypt Public), then (k : Public)∈E and E; x1 : Public; : : : ; xn : PublicP. There-
fore, E 0 k : KL[: : :], and E  {M1; : : : ; Mn}k : Public has been derived using (En-
crypt Public). The hypotheses of this rule include E Mi : Public for all i∈
{1; : : : ; n}.
In all cases, we obtain E P{M1=x1; : : : ; Mn=xn} by Lemma 2.
References
[1] M. Abadi, Secrecy by typing in security protocols, J. ACM 46 (5) (1999) 749–786.
[2] M. Abadi, Security protocols and their properties, in: F.L. Bauer, R. Steinbrueggen (Eds.), Foundations
of Secure Computation, NATO Science Series, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000, pp. 39–60. Volume for
the 20th International Summer School on Foundations of Secure Computation, Marktoberdorf, Germany,
1999.
[3] M. Abadi, B. Blanchet, Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs, in: Proc.
29th Annu. ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, January 2002, pp. 33–44.
[4] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, Inform. and Comput.
148 (1) (1999) 1–70, An extended version appeared as Digital Equipment Corporation Systems Research
Center Report No. 149, January 1998.
414 M. Abadi, B. Blanchet / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 387– 415
[5] M. Abadi, R. Needham, Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols, IEEE Trans. Software
Engng. 22 (1) (1996) 6–15.
[6] R. Anderson, R. Needham, Robustness principles for public key protocols, in: Proc. Crypto ’95, 1995,
pp. 236–247.
[7] A. Birrell, G. Nelson, S. Owicki, E. Wobber, Network objects, Software Practice Exp. S4 (25) (1995)
87–130.
[8] B. Blanchet, An e/cient cryptographic protocol veri6er based on Prolog rules, in: 14th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), IEEE Computer Society, Silver Spring, MD, June 2001,
pp. 82–96.
[9] C. Bodei, Security issues in process calculi, Ph.D. Thesis, UniversitVa di Pisa, January 2000.
[10] C. Bodei, P. Degano, F. Nielson, H.R. Nielson, Control Oow analysis for the &-calculus, in:
CONCUR’98: Concurrency Theory, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1466, Springer, Berlin,
September 1998, pp. 84–98.
[11] L. Cardelli, G. Ghelli, A.D. Gordon, Secrecy and group creation, in: C. Palamidessi (Ed.), CONCUR
2000: Concurrency Theory, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1877, Springer, Berlin, August
2000, pp. 365–379.
[12] I. Cervesato, N.A. Durgin, P.D. Lincoln, J.C. Mitchell, A. Scedrov, A meta-notation for protocol
analysis, in: Proc. 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’99), IEEE Computer
Society Press, Silver Spring, MD, June 1999, pp. 55–69.
[13] M. Debbabi, M. Mejri, N. Tawbi, I. Yahmadi, A new algorithm for the automatic veri6cation of
authentication protocols: from speci6cations to Oaws and attack scenarios, in: Proc. DIMACS Workshop
on Design and Formal Veri6cation of Security Protocols, Rutgers University, New Jersey, September
1997.
[14] G. Denker, J. Meseguer, C. Talcott, Protocol speci6cation and analysis in Maude, in: N. Heintze,
J. Wing (Eds.), Proc. Workshop on Formal Methods and Security Protocols, Indianapolis, IN, 25 June
1998.
[15] D.E. Denning, Cryptography and Data Security, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1982.
[16] C. Fournet, G. Gonthier, The reOexive chemical abstract machine and the join-calculus, in: Proc. 23rd
ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, January 1996, pp. 372–385.
[17] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, Probabilistic encryption, J. Comput. System Sci. 28 (1984) 270–299.
[18] A. Gordon, A. Je3rey, Authenticity by typing for security protocols, in: 14th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), IEEE Computer Society, Silver Spring, MD, June 2001,
pp. 145–159.
[19] N. Heintze, J.G. Riecke, The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity, in: Proc. 25th
ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, 1998, pp. 365–377.
[20] M. Hennessy, J. Riely, Information Oow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus, in: Proc.
27th Internat. Colloq. on Automata, Languages and Programming, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 415–427.
[21] K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos, N. Yoshida, Secure information Oow as typed process behaviour, in:
G. Smolka (Ed.), Programming Languages and Systems: Proc. 9th European Symp. on Programming
(ESOP 2000), Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software
(ETAPS 2000), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1782, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 180–199.
[22] R. Kemmerer, C. Meadows, J. Millen, Three systems for cryptographic protocol analysis, J. Cryptol. 7
(2) (1994) 79–130.
[23] G. Lowe, Breaking and 6xing the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR, in: Tools and
Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
1055, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 147–166.
[24] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Boca
Raton, FL, 1996.
[25] M. Merro, D. Sangiorgi, On asynchrony in name-passing calculi, in: Proc. 25th Internat. Colloq. on
Automata, Languages and Programming, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1443, Springer, Berlin,
1998, pp. 856–867.
[26] J. Millen, H. Ruess, Protocol-independent secrecy, in: Proc. 2000 IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy,
May 2000, pp. 110–119.
M. Abadi, B. Blanchet / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 387– 415 415
[27] R. Milner, J. Parrow, D. Walker, A calculus of mobile processes, parts I and II, Inform. and Comput.
100 (1992) 1–40, 41–77.
[28] A.C. Myers, JFlow: practical mostly-static information Oow control, in: Proc. 26th ACM Symp. on
Principles of Programming Languages, January 1999, pp. 228–241.
[29] A.C. Myers, B. Liskov, A decentralized model for information Oow control, in: Proc. 16th ACM Symp.
on Operating System Principles, 1997, pp. 129–142.
[30] R.M. Needham, M.D. Schroeder, Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers,
Commun. ACM 21 (12) (1978) 993–999.
[31] L.C. Paulson, The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols, J. Comput. Security 6 (1–2)
(1998) 85–128.
[32] F. Pottier, S. Conchon, Information Oow inference for free, in: Proc. 2000 ACM SIGPLAN Internat.
Conf. on Functional Programming (ICFP’00), September 2000, pp. 46–57.
[33] J. Riely, M. Hennessy, Trust and partial typing in open systems of mobile agents, in: Proc. 26th ACM
Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages, January 1999, pp. 93–104.
[34] K.R.M. Leino, R. Joshi, A semantic approach to secure information Oow, in: Mathematics of Program
Construction, 4th Internat. Conf., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1422, Springer, Berlin, 1998,
pp. 254–271.
[35] D. Volpano, C. Irvine, G. Smith, A sound type system for secure Oow analysis, J. Comput. Security 4
(1996) 167–187.
[36] C. Weidenbach, Towards an automatic analysis of security protocols in 6rst-order logic, in: H. Ganzinger
(Ed.), 16th Internat. Conf. on Automated Deduction (CADE-16), Lecture Notes in Arti6cial Intelligence,
vol. 1632, Springer, Berlin, July 1999, pp. 314–328.
